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Abstract: We introduce into the Penna Model for biological ageing one of
the possible male mechanisms used to maximize the ability of their sperm to
compete with sperm from other males. Such a selfish mechanism increases the
male reproduction success but may decrease the survival probability of the
whole female population, depending on how it acts. We also find a dynamic
phase transition induced by the existence of an absorbing state where no
selfish males survive.
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1 Introduction
According to Promislow and Pletcher [1] during the last 20 years there have
been incredible advances in our undestanding of the evolution of develop-
ment, in molecular evolution, and so on. However, theories of ageing have re-
mained relatively restricted to the mutation accumulation theory of Medawar
[2, 3] or to the antagonistic pleiotropy theory of Williams [4]. In their opinion,
there are major evolutionary questions that could play a very important role
in the evolution of senescence. One of these questions concerns the conflict
between sexes.
In flies and many other species females mate several times in a short
period, and store the sperm of different males. Thus, males have evolved
mechanisms to maximize the ability of their sperm to compete with those of
other males, at the expenses of the female’s fitness. For instance, one protein
found in the fruit fly male ejaculate has been shown to be similar to a spider
neurotoxin [5].
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Here we introduce into the Penna model for biological ageing [7], which
is based on the mutation accumulation theory, such a kind of male strategy,
in order to study the consequences on population survival.
2 The Penna model
In the asexual version of the Penna model (see [6] for several applications) the
genome of each individual is represented by a computer word of 32 bits. Each
bit corresponds to one “year” in the individual lifetime, and consequently
each individual can live at most for 32 “years”. A bit set to one means that
the individual will suffer from the effects of a deleterious inherited mutation
(genetic disease) in that and all following years. One step of the simulation
corresponds to reading one bit of all genomes. Whenever a new bit of a given
genome is read, we increase by one the individual’s age. The rules for the
individual to stay alive are: 1) The number of inherited diseases (bits set to
1) already accumulated until its current age must be lower than a threshold
T , the same for the whole population. 2) There is a competition for space and
food given by the logistic Verhulst factor V = 1 − N(t)/Nmax, where Nmax
is the maximum population size the environment can support and N(t) is
the current population size. We will consider Nmax five times larger than the
initial population N(0). At each time step and for each individual a random
number between zero and one is generated and compared with V : if it is
greater than V , the individual dies independently of its age or genome.
If the individual survives until a minimum reproduction age R, it gener-
ates b offspring in that and all following years. The offspring genome is a
copy of the parent’s one, except for some randomly chosen deleterious mu-
tations introduced at birth. That is, if a bit 1 is randomly tossed in the
parent’s genome, it remains 1 in the offspring genome; however, if a bit zero
is randomly tossed, it is set to 1 in the mutated offspring genome. In this
way, for the asexual reproduction the offspring is always as good as or worse
than the parent.
The sexual version of the Penna model was first introduced by Bernardes
[8], followed by Stauffer et al. [9], who adopted a slightly different strat-
egy. We are going to describe and use the second one. Now individuals are
diploids, with their genomes represented by two bit-strings that are read in
parallel. In order to count the accumulated number of mutations and com-
pare it with the threshold T , it is necessary to distinguish between recessive
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and dominant mutations. A mutation is counted if two bits set to 1 appear
at the same position in both bit-strings (inherited from both parents) or if it
appears in only one of the bit-strings but at a dominant position (locus). The
dominant positions are randomly chosen at the beginning of the simulation
and are the same for all individuals.
The population is now divided into males and females. After reaching the
minimum reproduction age R, a female randomly chooses a male with age
also equal to or greater than R to mate. To construct one offspring genome
first the two bit-strings of the mother are cut in a random position (crossing),
producing four bit-string pieces. Two complementary pieces are chosen to
form the female gamete (recombination). Finally, mf deleterious mutations
are randomly introduced. The same process occurs with the male’s genome,
producing the male gamete withmm deleterious mutations. These two result-
ing bit-strings form the offspring genome. The sex of the baby is randomly
chosen, each with probability 50%. This whole strategy is repeated b times
to produce the b offspring. The Verhulst killing factor already mentioned
works in the same way as in the asexual reproduction.
3 Male selfish strategy and results
To simulate the male ability to increase its own reproductive success we
attribute to half of the male population a label, to play the role of a selfish
gene. The offspring of a selfish male may inherit this gene with a given
probability ps. Non-selfish males produce only non-selfish offspring. The
selfish male has the advantage that whenever it mates, the female generates
b + 1 offspring (instead of b as the non-selfish males). On the other hand,
the female pays the bill for this male advantage (as usual). We tested two
different prices to be paid:
case 1) If a female mates with a selfish male she loses forever part of her
energy to dispute for food and space; That is, her probability to die due
to the Verhulst factor increases 20% (or equivalently, for her the carrying
capacity Nmax becomes 20% smaller). Such a punishement occurs only once;
if she mates again with another selfish male, nothing new happens.
case 2) Whenever a female mates with a selfish male, her genetic death age
(programmed since birth as the age where the T -th genetic disease would
appear) is decreased by one, i.e. the female dies one year before the expected
date. Note that in this case there is always a price to be paid, that does not
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depend on the value of any random number, contrary to the previous one.
For both cases we observe that if the selfish gene inheritance probability
ps is below a given value pc, after many generations no selfish male remains
in the population. When ps increases above pc, the percentage of selfish
males also increases, reaching 100% for ps = 1. In figure 1 we show how this
percentage increases with increasing ps, for case 1). Squares correspond to a
larger population. The curve for case 2) is analogous. There is a dynamical
phase transition between an absorbing state in which selfish males are extinct,
and a state where they do survive. The order parameter of this transition is
the fraction shown in figure 1.
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Figure 1: Final fraction of selfish males as a function of the inheritance
probability ps for case 1.) Common parameters: threshold number of bad
mutations T = 3; minimum reproduction age R = 8; birth rate b = 4;
mutation ratesmm = mf = 1; results averaged over the last 10,000 timesteps.
Circles: initial population P (0) = 100, 000 and total number of timestpes
t = 100, 000; Squares: P (0) = 200, 000 and t = 200, 000.
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Figure 2: Female survival probabilities as a function of age for case 2). The
parameters are the same as those of the larger populations of fig. 1. For any
ps < pc, male and female survival probabilities are the same.
In both cases the total (already stable) population fluctuates around half
of the value of the initial population, independently of the ps value. In the
first case the male and female population sizes are always the same, as well
as their survival probabilities as a function of age. (The survival probability
S(a) is defined as the ratio between the number of individuals with age a+1
and the number of individuals with age a.)
However, in the second case the female survival probability decreases
with increasing values of ps, in comparison to the male survival probability
(which does not change at all). Results are shown in figure 2. Also the female
population sizes are slightly smaller than the male ones, when ps > pc. For
an initial population of 200,000 individuals (half of each sex), when ps < pc
both the male and female populations stabilize around 87,000. When ps = 1,
the male population stabilizes around 88,000 individuals and the female one,
around 84,000.
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4 Conclusions
We introduce into the Penna model for biological ageing a male strategy
that improves its sperm ability to compete with sperm from other males.
We obtain that depending on how this strategy works, it may decrease the
female survival probability as a function of age. Considering as an order
parameter the percentage of males carrying such an ability, we observe a
phase transition between populations where no such males survive (after
many generations) and populations where they succeed, depending on the
probability of their offspring to inherit this “selfish gene”.
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